For a less chatty version of this, see my CV or my Google Scholar profile. Most of my research is about how states negotiate agreements with each other. In particular I'm interested in situations where those agreements are riskier for one side than the other, and in how states manage agreements despite those unequal risks. 

Negotiating International Organizations (ongoing project)

Outside options matter, because they give parties to an agreement the ability to renegotiate the terms of the agreements after they've been implemented. When risks are unequal, institutional mechanisms that promote flexibility and easy exit can reduce the appeal of cooperation, since unequal dependence raises the risk that, once cooperation has begun, the less-dependent side will renegotiate terms to its advantage.   

Working paper: Contrived Symmetry through the IAEA. Negotiations in the 1940s-50s over international cooperation to regulate atomic energy illustrate the problem. In a book project, in progress, I examine the development of the nonproliferation regime through the following 70 years. 

China's Strategic Multilateralism (ongoing project)

Coauthored with Scott Kastner and Margaret Pearson. We argue that the strategic setting of each major issue of global concern will influence whether and how China engages constructively in supporting multilateral regimes. Depending on China's exit options and the perception that Chinese contribution to governance might be indispensable, China will be more likely to invest in multilateral institutions, hold up cooperation as a way to secure more favorable terms for itself, or passively accept existing regimes while free-riding on their benefits. 

Paper: China in Multilateral Governance. Exit options shape China's approach to IO governance. China's approach to multilateral regimes focused on North Korea's nuclear program and on global financial governance test the theory.

Federations and National Reunification

States form federations when cooperation would lead them to make unequal investments, making some vulnerable to later renegotiation. Federal unions create contrived symmetry, which solves the contracting problem. States form international organizations when they fundamentally trust each other to refrain from future renegotiation (or when the potential downside of renegotiation is low) and form federations when they mistrust each other. Federations therefore occur when the only realistic alternative is a complete failure of cooperation; federations do not emerge in a linear way from international organizations.    

Book: Federations: The Political Dynamics of Cooperation. The struggles surrounding regional integration projects in Australia, Argentina, Germany, East Africa, and the Caribbean provide evidence for the argument. (Amazon. Ebook. Data used in chapters 3 and 4.) 

Some other applications:

Capital Controls in Developed Democracies

The pattern of capital controls policy changes in all continuous OECD democracies since 1950 shows a large effect of partisanship. Caoauthored with Scott Kastner. All data and replication files.

Misc. Papers on random other topics that I am unlikely to keep working on.