Associate professor of Politics at Marymount University.

steering committee for the international studies minor.

Chad Rector
Politics, Marymount
2807 N. Glebe Rd
Arlington, VA 22207

Ireton Hall (map)
Room G108

Chatty overview of my research 
For a straight list see my CV or my Google Scholar profile

My research is mostly about how states negotiate agreements with each other. In particular I'm interested in situations where those agreements are riskier for one side than the other, and in how states manage agreements despite those unequal risks. 

Negotiating International Organizations
Outside options matter, because they give parties to an agreement the ability to renegotiate the terms of the agreements after they've been implemented. When risks are unequal, institutional mechanisms that promote flexibility and easy exit can reduce the appeal of cooperation, since unequal dependence raises the risk that, once cooperation has begun, the less-dependent side will renegotiate terms to its advantage.   

Federation and National Reunification
States form federations when cooperation would lead them to make unequal investments, making some vulnerable to later renegotiation. Federal unions create
contrived symmetry, which solves the contracting problem. States form international organizations when they fundamentally trust each other to refrain from future renegotiations (or when the potential downside of renegotiation is low) and form federations when they mistrust each other. Federations therefore occur when the only realistic alternative is a complete failure of cooperation; federations do not emerge in a linear way from international organizations.    

Capital controls
The pattern of capital controls policy changes in all continuous OECD democracies since 1950 shows a large effect of partisanship. Data (textexcelspss) and codebook (pdftext).

Papers on random other topics that, I think, make sensible arguments, but that I am unlikely to keep working on.